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In the late eighteenth century in India, the forces of indigenous rulers
ranged from cavalry without infantry or artillery, through cavalry supported
by artillery, to mixed infantry and cavalry, to infantry with irregular
cavalry. This variety continued, in spite of convincing demonstrations of
the military superiority of European-style artillery and infantry forces more
than 30 years earlier in campaigns involving the British and the French. The
central question is, by the opening of the nineteenth century, why had so
few Indian rulers adopted the European system?
The answers take us away from abstract questions of military ’efficiency’
to the actual complexities of the introduction of a new technology and new
military organisation. A successful military system from outside the society
causes rethinking, refocusing of resources, and other sorts of stress in a
society and, thus, illuminates the complex, changing and often contradictory
symbolical systems which surround and embed both the existing and the
challenging military systems.’ In the India of the eighteenth century, we
can conceive of each court as a micro theatre in which real rulers and
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nobles weighed and contested full or partial adoption of a new military
system against a variety of symbolic and structural changes and their
perceived costs.’
The Weaponry of Mughal India
As a point of departure, let us consider Mughal armies, from Bahur’s
invading force which reached the Indian plains in the first decade of the
sixteenth century through Akbar’s at the end of the sixteenth century.
Most obviously, this was an army of cavalry. Out of the Central Asian
background, men (and women) learned to ride as early as they could walk.
Most extant paintings of the Mughals at war or on the hunt show them on
horseback. Babur, hearing of an opportunity for conquest more than 150
miles away, described the whirlwind activities of the next three days, as
follows:
Off we hurried, that very hour-it was sunset-without reflecting, with-
out a moment’s delay .... Through that night it was rushed without
delaying anywhere, and on next day until at the Mid-day Prayer, halt
was made .... There we cooled down our horses and gave them com.
We rode out again at beat of (twilight) drum and on through that night
till shoot of dawn, and through the next day till sunset, and on through
that night till, just before dawn, we were ... [at] Marghinan.3
Unlike infantry, cavalry could travel vast distances, choose where and
when to fight, and disengage in an orderly, rapid, strategic retreat. Mughals
were, thus, a late manifestation of an earlier and highly successful revolu-
tion in military technology, horseback warfare of the Central Asian steppe
nomads. Out of these grasslands, so productive for raising horses, had
come the Huns, various Turkish bands and the Mongols (under Ghenghis
Khan and his successors) who invaded west into Europe, east into China,
and south into the Levant.
. In this tradition, the Mughals took horse grading and branding seriously.
The top grade was Turki horse, followed by the Yabu, Tazi and Jangalah.
The top three were larger, stronger breeds imported into India, and the
lowest category was a smaller, locally-bred horse.’
2 This approach avoids consideration of overall ’superiority’ or ’inferiority’ of non-Western
technology, a not very productive question, but one which has generated much literature,
both in the West and Asia. See William McNeil, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed
Force and Society since A.D. 1000, Oxford, 1983. Also, A. Dharampal, Indian Science and
Technology in the Eighteenth Century, Delhi, 1971; Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj,
1857-1905, Oxford, 1995.
3 Baburnama, trans. A.S. Beveridge, Delhi, 1989 rpt, pp. 99-100.
4 Rafi A. Alavi, ’New Light on Mughal Cavalry’, in Medieval India: A Miscellany, Volume
2, Aligarh, 1972, pp. 73-74; see also William Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghals: Its
Organisation and Administration, Delhi, 1962 rpt, p. 52.
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Every man brings his own horse and offers himself to be inlisted [sic].
The horse; and not the man, is carefully examined; and according to the
size and value of the beast, the master receives his pay.5
The downgrading of locally-bred horses was a result of how the Mughals
defined warfare.
Cavalry meant heavy cavalry. A trooper normally wore linen quilting
and chain mail, a helmet, plus a breastplate, back-plate, and two side
plates, leg plates, arm plates, a neckpiece and gauntlets.
The principal weapon of this heavily armoured soldier on horseback was
the bow, particularly the short, reverse-curve bow common to Persia and
Central Asia. Recent scientific experiments have shown that this bow
delivers substantially more penetrating power than any but the largest and
heaviest longbows.6 Often it was made of composite materials such as
wood and horn, which made it even more powerful. Unlike the longbow, it
could, of course, be used from horseback. It is archery practice with the
reverse-curve bow which we find both in Mughal normative texts on military
practice and in actual descriptions of the daily round of Mughal armies.’
Mughal swords were curved swords, effective only for slashing from
horseback. This curved sword appears in many depictions of the Mughal
emperor, even when he was at leisure in his harem.8 Along with swords and
daggers, ornate quivers and horse trappings were routinely given to honour
meritorious actions.
And what of firearms in Mughal armies? They were not generally
central to battle. This is corroborated in Babur’s memoirs, as well as the
court chronicles of his successors, Humayun and Akbar. Matchlocks had
serious problems; they were heavy, inaccurate, slow to load, and could not
be used from horseback.9 Even well into the seventeenth century, a cavalry-
man could get off six arrows in the time it took to fire a single shot from a
matchlock.’° Matchlocks were basically relegated to the infantry, indigen-
ously-recruited units held in such contempt that they were listed along with
litter bearers, carpenters, wood-cutters and cotton carders in the military
pay records.&dquo; The only campaigns in which honourable cavalry routinely
5 Robert Orme, Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire, London, 1805, p. 418 
6 Edward McEwen, Robert L. Miller and Christopher A. Bergman, ’Early Bow Design and
Construction’, Scientific American, June 1991, pp. 76-82.
7 For other representations of this type of army in camp and in battle, see P. Pal, Court
Paintings of India, 16th-19th Centuries, New York, 1983; see also, Michael Brand and Glenn
D. Lowry, Akbar’s India: Art from the Mughal City of Victory, New York, 1986.
8 Vishaka N. Desai, Life at Court: Art for India’s Rulers, 16th-19th Centuries, Boston,
1985, Plate 71.
9 Mughal paintings show these early shoulder arms in use from covered platforms mounted
on the backs of elephants, but mainly in hunting.
10 Francois Bernier, Travels in the Mogul Empire, A.D. 1656-1668, second edition (revised
by Vincent A. Smith), Delhi, 1989 rpt.
11 Irvine, The Army ofthe Indian Moghals, p. 155.
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used shoulder arms were in areas oi difficult terrain, such as the riverine
areas of eastern Bengal and the Himalayan hills.&dquo;
Lastly, consider artillery. In virtually all paintings showing Mughal battles
of the late sixteenth century, guns seem completely unintegrated into the
swirl of cavalry charges. 13 Documentary sources support the visual evidence
that guns were slow to fire (on the order of a couple of times an hour),
inaccurate, and far too heavy to move in support of cavalry movements. 14
For Babur, perhaps their most important use was for holding off the initial
charges of the Rajput cavalry in the battle of Khanwa (1527). Nevertheless,
the battle was won by the Mughals by cavalry charge with bow and arrow
and hand-to-hand combat.’ These early guns were, in fact, much more
effective against forts than they were in plains battles, and this is how they
are often portrayed in the paintings of the period.’6 Like the infantry, the
artillery branch had little prestige or chance of advancement; it was mainly
staffed by ’Portuguese, English, Dutch, Germans, and French; fugitives
from Goa, and from the Dutch and English companies’.&dquo;
The optimal battle situation for such an army was on the plains, where
the cavalry could manoeuvre, wheel, and charge. Tactics divided the
cavalry into ’wings’, plus a designated vanguard and reserve. Artillery was
drawn up in front and usually opened the battle, but was too heavy to move
with the fighting of the remainder of the day. The main tactic was the
massed charge (to the accompaniment of huge drums), using first bow and
arrow, followed by hand-to-hand combat with sword. If the line weakened,
the commander (watching from his elephant) sent in reserves. The battle
was decided by the death, capture or retreat of the commander, after
which his army fled, leaving tents, baggage, reserve horses, the bazaar and
guns as loot for the winning side.
12 The use of matchlocks in river warfare in Bengal is illustrated in a dispersed page from the
Beatty Collection Akbarnama now in the Cincinnati Museum. See Ellen S. Smart and
Daniel S. Walker, The Pride ofPrinces: Indian Art of the Mughal Era in the Cincinnati Art
Museum, Cincinnati, 1985. Documentary evidence corroborating this portrayal is found
throughout the many battles described by Mirza Nathan, who served in Bengal for 20 years in
the reign of Jahangir. See Baharistan-i-Ghaybi, trans. M.I. Borah, Assam, 1936.
13 See, for example, G.N. Pant, Mughal Weapons in the Baburnama, New Delhi, 1989,
Plate 1.
14 For example, see the static arrangement of the artillery in ’A’zam Khan captures Fort
Dharur’ from the Royal Library, Windsor Castle, fol. 91b, published in P. Pal, Master Artists
of the Imperial Mughal Court, Bombay, 1991, p. 143.
15 J.N. Sarkar, Military History of India, Calcutta, 1960, p. 47.
16 See, for example, the famous Akbarnama painting by Miskina and Paras of a cannon
being dragged up to the siege of Ranthambor, Victoria and Albert Museum, Acc. No. 72/117,
published, among other places, in Geeti Sen, Paintings from the Akbar Nama: A Visual
Chronicle of Mughal India, Calcutta, 1984.
17 Bernier, Travels, p. 217.
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Paying Armies in Mughal India: Loot, Mansabdari and Watan
For the early Mughal armies, as under Babur, loot was the most common
source of pay of troopers. Loot of a nearby countryside was as common as
loot following a battle. The choice of battle site was often dictated by the
availability of nearby populated countryside to loot. From the nomadic
background of the Mughals, we find the expected tension between the
mobility and freedom of the conquering war band and the desire for stable
on-going revenue. Thus, whenever Babur held a region for even one
agricultural season, he promptly allotted various sections and villages to his
main leaders, as their ’places’ for maintenance. Babur is especially poignant
on this subject. ’It passed through my mind that to wander from mountain
to mountain, homeless and houseless, without country or abiding place,
had nothing to recommend it.’’8
The ordinary, ongoing processes of military service in India were surpris-
ingly similar to Babur’s ’placing’ of his leaders. At least as early as the
fourteenth century, large groups of armed men indigenous to India sought
military service, were willing to move long distances to find it and shared
an ethos of service.&dquo; Men and families sought military service for pay,
booty, status and honour-but principally as entrepreneurial activity. Men
joined armies for the chance to establish hereditary rights to revenue by
written appointment from the ruler they served.2° They fought to get or
enhance their watan, a word used across all of India (except the extreme
south) to mean core familial rights to revenue, deeply tied to sense of
place. 21
To get a clearer understanding of this South Asian watan process, let us
look briefly at the records of the Mane family of southern Maharashtra,
who served the Bijapur Sultanate in the seventeenth century, and whose
watan was the area around the town of Mhasvad.
A cluster of documents from 1666-67 shows the dependence of the Adil
Shah government on the Manes for local military forces and their forces in
larger campaigns.
18 Baburnama, p. 153.
19 Dirk H.A. Kolff, Naukar, Rajput and Sepoy: The Ethnohistory of the Military Labour
Market in Hindustan, 1450-1850, Cambridge, 1990. 
20 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
21 The first choice of term to describe the receipt of local land rights in return for military
service might have been iqta. This term describes precisely the relationship between a Muslim
ruler and his military followers, from the first Muslim invasions of India onwards. When the
relationship moved beyond the Muslim followers to indigenous local militarised families, it
was rarely termed iqta; more commmonly, these groups termed the relationship watan. I have,
therefore, chosen to use the term watan. See Richard Eaton, ’Iqta tenure in the Deccan in the
age of Timur’, Paper Presented at the Conference on South Asia, Madison, 1996, unpublished.
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Sayyad Ilias Saya Khan, commander, pleased with the valour of Rataji
Narsingrao Mane in repulsing the attack of Mirza Raja Jai Singh on
Bijapur, recommended to Ali Adil Shah II [Sultan of Bijapur] that the
deshmukhi watan of Kasbe Kaladhon be granted to Rataji Mane. So a
watan sanad is issued. 22
April 1666
Note the term desbmukh used in this quote. Literally, it translates as
’mouth of the land’; with its use, all governments of the time recognised
that these militarised local families were much more than government
appointees. Their rights as deshmukh often went to a family who had either
settled and developed vacant land or been instrumental in resettling land
after it became vacant through war or famine. Note, also, that the location
of this new grant of deshmukh in Kaladhon was in the area immediately
adjacent to the core area of the Mane family holdings.
Other papers of the same months in 1766 illustrate the use of Rataji
Mane’s troops closer to home.
Ali Adil Shah II writes to Rataji [that] these villages are troubled by
Naiji Pandre, who has claimed that he has the mokassa grant and began
collecting the revenue, by force. So, proceed immediately on receipt of
the firman (order), with the necessary force and give stern warning to
Punjaji Jamadar, who represents said Naiji Pandre. Expel him, and
warn him not to come again .... Inform us accordingly.23
Two months later, in recognition of expelling Naiji Pandre from the
district, Rataji Mane was rewarded with robes of honour from the Bijapur
court. ’Wear it and be honoured; you have done good service.’
In the next year, Rataji undertook two more tasks using his troops to
enforce the authority of Bijapur. At the request of Ali Adil Shah II, he
drove out one Kandoji from his village which had been resumed by the
Adil Shahi government. A month later, Rataji was instructed by the Adil
Shahi ruler to warn two Nimbalkar brothers that they should leave as they
were disrupting territory belonging to Ali Adil Shah II. Presumably, Rataji
completed both tasks, because he was later rewarded with robes of honour.
It hardly matters where one tracks similar family documents of men in
military service in the Indian regions of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bengal,
Malwa or Maharashtra-this is the dominant pattern. These local cavalry
were a ruler’s most important source of troops in the countryside, probably
more valuable than troops housed in the forts of the area. Muslim sultans
and Hindu rajas alike used these armed local families to repel invaders,
disarm rebels and join other troops as main force fighting units of the
22 D.A. Pawar, ed., Tarabaikalin Kagadpatre, Kolhapur, 1969, p. 124. Translation mine, with
the assistance of Dr Shiresh Chikte.
23 Ibid., p. 129.
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kingdom. Close ties between ruler and family included personal audiences
frequent letters, robes of honour and, most important, written contracts to
rights in their local watan area.
I want to emphasise several features of this system. First, in any region,
the number of families involved in this system was large. On the central
plains area of Malwa (roughly 120 miles by 150 miles), a Mughal heartland,
more than 80 named, armed families possessed administrative functions
similar to the Mane family of Maharashtra. All had at least mud-walled
fortified houses. More than a dozen had significant stone forts. If we
include the hilly areas of eastern and western Malwa, the number doubles. 24
Second, this system of local troops was deeply interwined with the
rhythm of the Indian agricultural year. Monsoon was the time of year for
planting and harvesting; whether or not the local military family did it
themselves, they had an intimate interest in the results. The end of monsoon
and the Dussehra festival were the time for meeting, mustering and cam-
paigning. Though these troops were ’available’ for campaigns, they were
primarily available in their local area. Kings Knew this; if one tracks the
military activities of any of these armed families, once settled, they rarely
travelled more than 50 miles from home, and not in monsoon.
Third, this whole system was defined by cavalry, men on horses. Horse-
mounted locally-based service was an indigenous Indian tradition. Pay at
the beginning of campaign was called ’stirrup money’. We have only to
look at the hero stones of the tenth to thirteenth centuries from local areas
of Karnataka and Maharashtra, or tribal areas of Central India and Rajas-
than, to see that the local hero and protector was mounted on horseback. 21
It was horse-mounted service (and its attendant watan rewards) which
differentiated the family from the surronding peasant cultivators. Virtually
all the symbols of honour granted by kings to watan-holders were associ-
ated with the horse-especially kbilat (robes of honour), but also horses,
saddles, daggers and standards. 26
Fourth, in spite of the weakening of the Mughal empire in the first half
of the eighteenth century, this watan system was strengthening. Across all
of northern India, Mughal officials were busily turning their regional jobs
into local watans. In the riverine areas and foothills of northern India, local
militarised families were strengthening their watans by eliminating detailed
24 W.H. Tone, who travelled through Khandesh in the late eighteenth century, counted
20 forts in the course of a day’s march. W.H. Tone, Illustrations of Some Institutions of the
Maratha People, London, 1818, p. 9.
25 S. Settar and Gunther D. Sontheimer, Memorial Stones: A Study of their Origin,
Significance and Variety, Dharwad and Heidelberg, 1982.
26 It is well known that Shivaji, founder of the Maratha polity, had infantry in nearly
equivalent numbers to his cavalry and that these troops were important in battles which
centred on forts in Maharashtra. Nevertheless, soon after Shivaji’s death, warfare between
the Mughals and the Marathas dictated rapid movement on horseback, and the infantry
dwindled.
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revenue data which formerly flowed to the Mughal court. 21 Perhaps even
more interesting, during the seventeenth century, the whole ethos of horse
service and its symbols of honour had reached people never before associated
with it and was used as a means of upward social mobility. For example, in
broad areas of tribal Central India, the horse-based ethos of Rajput kings
displaced the indigenous tribal ethos of kingship. The process of tribals
aspiring (often successfully) to become Rajputs had begun.28In Maha-
rashtra, horse service in the Deccan Sultanates had deeply changed the
self-image of various castes into something known as ’Maratha’; it was the
common traditions and symbols of cavalry service which differentiated the
’Marathas’ from relatives who were cultivators, ironworkers, or shepherds.29
In summary, whereas both muskets and artillery were thoroughly
embedded in an indigenous military system of symbols, practice and honour,
well before the advent of the new European system in the mid-eighteenth
century, cavalry was the high-prestige, high-pay branch of military service.
Local militarised families pledged cavalry service against lucrative shares
of local government taxation. For rulers, these forces were the principal
troops in the countryside, performing police duties and joining main force
armies. The symbols of honour such as robes and swords were over-
whelmingly associated with horse service.
Some small evidence indicates that muskets were starting to be considered
’honourable’, when carried by cavalry, who dismounted and fired.3° Infantry,
nevertheless, remained low-pay, low-prestige and rarely decisive in battle.3’
The foot soldiers receive the smallest pay; and, to be sure, the musketeers
cut a sorry figure at the best of times, which may be said to be when
squatting on the ground, and resting their muskets on a kind of wooden
fork .... Even then, they are terribly afraid of burning their eyes or
their long beards, and above all lest some Dgen, or evil spirit, should cause
the bursting of their musket.32
27 Muzaffar Alam, ’Eastern India in the early eighteenth century "crisis"’: Some evidence
from Bihar’, The Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol. 28 (1), 1991, pp. 53-55.
28 Surajit Sinha, ’State formation and Rajput myth in tribal central India’, Man in India,
Vol. 42 (1), January-March, 1962, pp. 35-75.
29 See the extensive discussion of the coalescence of the Maratha caste in Stewart Gordon,
Zones of military entrepreneurship in India, 1500-1700’, in idem, Marathas, Marauders, and
State Formation in Eighteenth-Century India, Delhi, 1994.
30 This appears to be the case in two mid-eighteenth century paintings, one from Central
India and one from the Himalayan hills. See P. Pal, Court Paintings of India, Plate R. 33; see
also, B.N. Goswamy and Eberhard Fischer, Pahari Masters: Court Painters of Northern India,
Zurich, 1992, Plate 97.
31 In looking at hundreds of images of Mughal and Deccan Sultanate rulers, it seems
striking that I have yet to see a ruler with a firearm either in a battle or a courtly setting. The
only context in which royalty regularly used firearms seems to have been hunting; rulers were,
however proud of good marksmanship, and had their kills recorded in official memoirs.
32 Bernier, Travels, p. 217.
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A. ’lery remained equally low-status, if somewhat higher paid. There
had, however, been solid progress in integrating the use of field guns.
Mughal artillery was generally respected and feared by other Indian powers
throughout the later half of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth
century. Indeed, some nobles of the seventeenth century were quite com-
mitted to the development of artillery. The best known of these was Mir
Jumla, the nobleman from the Muslim state of Bijapur (in southern India)
who took up Mughal service when that state was annexed. Nevertheless,
guns remained heavy and slow-firing, and of limited use on the mobile
battlefield dominated by cavalry. Above all, like the infantry, there was no
honour or hope of gaining local tax rights for artillery service.
The European Military System Reaches India
This is the military world into which the Europeans introduced their system
of warfare in the middle of the eighteenth century. Let us briefly summarise
the military situation in Europe. After 1500, developments occurred in
metallurgy and gun casting, the crossbow and pike and the musket, all
responses to the dominance of heavy cavalry. Continual warfare spurred
all manner of experiments in technology, strategy, tactics and organisation.
By the opening of the sixteenth century, massed firepower of infantry
could sometimes prevail against massed heavy cavalry. In the next century,
muskets and pikemen still got in each other’s way and were occasionally
overrun by heavy cavalry. With lighter guns came the technical solution:
simply attach the pike to the gun as a bayonet. Sporadic firing gave way to
organised firing on command. Drill, uniforms, officer training schools and
many other refinements preceded the system’s introduction into India.33
By the late seventeenth century, massed infantry formed the centre of
battle. This massed firepower was arranged five to six men deep, the front
man firing and moving to the back to reload. Reloading was slow and
cumbersome, though muskets got lighter and faster to load through the
course of the eighteenth century. This massing of muskets was extremely
lethal against cavalry. However, the range was short, no more than 80
yards at best. By the mid-eighteenth century, Europe’s best armies could
33 For our purposes, it is enough that European armies arriving in India were quite different
in organisation and focus than indigenous Indian ones. I wish to avoid the issue of whether
there was a military ’revolution’ in Europe in the seventeenth century. The debate goes back
more than 20 years now, though Geoffery Parker’s The Military Revolution: Military
Innovation and the Rise of the West, Cambridge, 1998, is less than a decade old. The
discussion is well summarised in C. Rogers, ed., The Military Revolution: The Debate,
Boulder, 1995. Recently, some historians have moved the ’revolution’ backwards and forwards
from the early Middle Ages to World War I. Other historians are rethinking the whole
concept. See John A. Lynn, ’The evolution of army style in the modern west, 800-2000’, The
International History Review, Vol. 17(3), August, 1996.
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sustain three rounds per minute per man. With this rate of fire, the lines
thinned down to two or three men deep and stretched out.
Battlefield success, in large part, depended on rate of fire, and, there-
fore, training, discipline and a command structure which clearly differen-
tiated ’officers’ from ’men’. By the seventeenth century, the European
knightly code of honour, with its symbols associated with individual combat
and heavy cavalry had been almost entirely supplanted by a structure of
honours and rewards (such as colours and insignia) for officers of infantry
units.
In Europe of the late seventeenth century, artillery was still heavy and
cumbersome. Over the next 50 years, however, especially in France,
England and Prussia, developments in artillery were quite rapid, especially
with government standardisation of bore, ball weight and firing procedure.
The results were much lighter, more accurate field pieces which could keep
up with marching infantry. By mid-century, these light, rapidly firing field
pieces were placed at the ends of the lines of infantry to fire at an angle
down the opposing lines.
What about the role of the cavalry? Commanders generally counted on
the cavalry for the decisive blow to finish a battle. Recall, for example,
each of Marlborough’s field battles, which ended in one or several cavalry
charges breaking through the opposing lines.
Cavalry was massed, in tight formation, and intended as a kind of rapidly
moving, lethal battering ram aimed against the centre of opposing infantry
lines.34 Cavalry used in this manner-highly disciplined, tight formations,
charging the infantry lines-remained the dominant pattern throughout
the eighteenth centur.y. In part, this strategy was dictated by the men
available. Recruited peasants did not have horsemanship in their back-
grounds ; therefore, cavalry manoeuvres were relatively simple and a matter
of learned drill (much like the loading of a firearm); they were only
effective with massed numbers and discipline. Most cavalry units sacrificed
speed to order and only attained a gallop at the very end of a charge.35 The
crucial point here is that European cavalry had a different training, structure
and battlefield dynamic than cavalry warfare as practised by ’men of the
horse’ in India.
Let us now turn our attention to the English in India. before the build up
of forces caused by the worldwide campaigns between the British and the
34 This argument generally follows Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for
Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo, Bloomington, 1991.
35 In the course of the eighteenth century in Europe, cavalry gradually became less central
as the rate of infantry and artillery fire improved. Especially important were efforts to
improve the battlefield mobility of infantry and the introduction of lighter horse-drawn
artillery in the closing decades of the eighteenth century. Some infantry units of necessity
were operating without cavalry, but all would have preferred having it-for skirmishing, for
foraging, for frontal attacks, for flanking actions, even for filing holes in the infantry line.
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French in the middle decades of the eighteenth century. From small units
guarding the trading factories, forces had grown to substantial size in the
1660-1680 period. For example, Bengal had a standing military of 250
infantry, supplemented by two companies of natives (a total of 135 men)
and 21 pieces of cannon. Bombay had 400 Royal troops, plus two companies
of Rajputs at 100 men each.36
Indigenous rules were well aware that these European traders were not
like other foreign traders; they came armed and represented kings. In the
late seventeenth century, a seasoned administrator of an indigenous kingdom
wrote this advice to his sovereign:
Amongst the merchants, the Portuguese and the English and the Dutch
and the French and the Danes and other hat-wearing merchants also do
carry on trade and commerce. But they are not like other merchants.
Their masters, every one of them, are ruling kings .... These hat-
wearers have full ambition to enter into these provinces to increase their
territories .... They should strictly never be given places to settle ....
Their strength lies in navy, guns and ammunition.3’
There had been, thus, many decades of military experimentation by the
English (including the recruitment of indigenous forces) by the mid-
eighteenth century build up. During these same decades, there had been
wary observation of the Europeans by indigenous rulers, but relatively few
occasions to see large units in warfare.
All of this changed with the French-English warfare of the mid-eighteenth
century. The French and the British brought in and raised much larger
units, and put them into battle. (Clive brought 2,400 men to the Battle of
Buxar in 1757.)3$ The successes of these regimental units included Bussy’s
campaigns in the Carnatic and Maharashtra, British victories in Bengal and
Oudh, and the swift British capture of Surat.39 The European command
structure allowed the unit to carry on even if the leader were injured or
killed. In contrast to indigenous armies, the European units could, if
necessary, retreat in order without rout.
Regiments in India operated without cavalry; it was difficult and expen-
sive to bring horses from Europe. Experience had shown that trained
36 Major Madan Paul Singh, Indian Army under the East India Company, New Delhi , 1976,
p. 2.
37 ’The Ajnapatra or Royal Edict’, trans. S.V. Puntambekar, Journal of Indian History,
Vol. 8 (2), August, 1929, pp. 212-13.
38 For example, Bombay received orders to raise seven companies of 80 men each, plus an
artillery company with 100 gunners. Singh, Indian Army, p. 5.
39 John Lynn types the British and French armies which arrived in India in the mid-
eighteenth century as ’state commission armies’ characterised by much more sophisticated
military administration, mainly paid professional troops, purchase of commissions, and lack
of national or patriotic commitments. Lynn, ’Evolution’, p. 537.
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musketeers, backed by artillery, could defeat much larger numbers of
indigenous cavalry. The East India Company had experimented with indi-
genous cavalry, found it useful at the Battle of Buxar, but disbanded the
units in 1765, genuinely afraid of what would happen if indigenous cavalry
learned the techniques of massed attack which overran infantry in Europe.
The progress that the natives make in the knowledge of art of war, both
in Bengal and on the coast of Coromandel is becoming a very alarming
circumstance, and we are not without apprehensions the consequence of
teaching them cavalry exercise.4o
In East India Company forces, there would be only a very small number
of cavalry and no European units until the first decade of the nineteenth
century.
The English were aware that they held a technical advantage in artillery
and took vigorous steps to prevent any non-English learning their gun
casting and firing techniques. The Court of Directors ordered the dismissal
of all non-English foreigners and natives from artillery service and wrote,
as follows:
No foreigner whether in our service or not ... nor any Indian or person
of mixed breed, nor any Roman Catholic of what nation whatsoever,
shall on any pretense be admitted to set foot on the laboratory or any
military magazine either out of curiosity or to be employed in them, or
to come near to them so as to see what is going on or contained therein. 41
Indian rules quickly became aware of the convincing demonstrations of
effectiveness of this new infantry/artillery system. For example, the Peshwa
(the de facto ruler of one of the largest states in India), when negotiating
with the British envoy from Bombay in 1756, ’expressed a definite desire to
have a body of English troops and artillery in the same manner as Mohomed
Ali of Arcot had been favoured by Madras’.42
Rulers were equally aware that it was not only technology they wanted;
it was a whole regimental system of military organisation, including uni-
forms and symbols, discipline and training, command structure and battle
array. They knew that this knowledge was the provenance of foreigners. If
the earliest response of Indian rulers was to hire the whole system from
either the English or the French, the second response was to hire Europeans
who knew the system. Within a decade, some enthusiastic indigenous
emulations of the regimental system emerged. Probably the best known is
Mir Qasim in Bengal, who raised 25,000 infantry under Walter Reinhard
40 Singh, Indian Army, p. 5.
41 Quoted in Singh, Indian Army, p. 5.
42 W.S. Desai, Bombay and the Marathas up to 1774, New Delhi, 1970, p. 154.
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and a regiment of gunners under Europeans. Unfortunately, much less is
known about Ibrahim Gardi, who raised a similar unit at Hyderabad, based
on his experience serving with Bussy in the Carnatic and Maharash-
trian campaigns (this unit was destroyed at the Third Battle of Panipat,
1761).
Indian Rulers and the New Military
In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, the responses of
Indian rulers to the European regimental system ranged all the way from
full adoption to complete rejection. Tipu Sultan’s forces, for example, had
uniforms, an officer corps, insignia, training manuals and an order of battle
comparable to any European army of the day.41 No other Indian ruler of
the late eighteenth century went that far. For example, Mahadji Shinde’s
infantry battalions (approximately 8,000 men under the Frenchman, De
Boigne) were mixed with 20,000 cavalry raised by the older watan system.
Some rulers, such as Hyderabad and Oudh, simply hired European units
and kept them separate from the rest of the army. Others, such as the
Peshwa, failed at hiring European units and employed Muslims trained in
the new system. Still other rulers, such as Mulhar Rao Holkar in the 1760s,
developed only artillery and did not hire Europeans or attempt to raise
European-style infantry. Many rulers, such as the Bhonsles of Nagpur,
chose completely to ignore the new system and continued to recruit cavalry
on the older watan system throughout the eighteenth century.
Let me suggest that there were three reasons for this variety of response
and that each individual response was in its way correct. First, along with
convincing shows of strength under the best of conditions, there were
equally convincing failures of the new infantry/artillery system. There were
problems of scale. Small units of under 200 men (larger if unsupported by
artillery) could not sustain a rate of fire necessary to stop a cavalry charge.
More serious were problems of terrain. In 1772, the British expeditionary
force struggling up the Western Ghats was effectively attacked by the
Peshwa’s Maratha cavalry. Equally serious were problems of supply. This
new army could not survive by foraging, and required a regular supply of
grain and ammunition. The two major defeats of the new armies in Maha-
rashtra. Bussy’s near Aurangabad in the 1750s and the British force in the
early 1770s, resulted from the cutting off of supplies (tactics which had
been relatively successful against the Mughals for 100 years). Finally, as
was broadly known in the eighteenth century, the new troops were cash-
expensive. A campaign was as likely to stop because of lack of credit as any
other reason.
43 There was universal respect by Tipu’s European opponents for his military organisation,
training and battle tactics. He has received some recent scholarly attention. See P. Barua,
’Military developments in India, 1750-1850’, Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, November,
1994, pp. 600-604.
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Perhaps most serious, and completely unexamined in the scholarly liter-
ature on the Indian military in the eighteenth century was the problem of
the bad fit between the infantry/artillery system and the expectations of
honour and reward for a ruler’s own nobles and military. Indigenous
military service in India in the eighteenth century had a very specific
dynamic and symbolic content. If we track, for example, the career of
Malhar Rao Holkar or Mahadji Shinde (prominent Maratha generals of
the mid-eighteenth century) from the 1720s, the accoutrements and rewards
of horse service are obvious. Each started as a young trooper, mustering at
the end of monsoon, in a small contingent led by a relative. Through
personal bravery and leadership, both received booty and the ceremonial
objects conferring honour, such as ornate robes, daggers, horses and
trappings. They also received the real rewards of service, rights to the
government’s share of revenue; in this case, both received rights in the
compact region of northern Maharashtra. Advancement was very rapid,
and within a decade of initial service, both men were leading large contin-
gents of cavalry, having received the revenue grants to support them, mainly
in central Indian. 44
If we compare this cavalry-based scenario to the new infantry, such rapid
advancement, such symbolic and material rewards were not possible for an
ordinary infantry soldier; he was but’a musket in a mass of firepower.
There was no scope for individual bravery and initiative which might come
to the notice of the ruler. Thus, the main effect of using these new forces
was to sever the intimate relations of horse based personal service, honour,
legitimacy and reward which bound together a ruler and service military
families.
In the new infantry/artillery system, only officers could claim rights to
government’s share of the revenue. Indeed, several Europeans, including
de Boigne, Perron and Walter Reinhard, gained large estates and rights to
shares of taxes. It is no surprise that these officers were treated with
suspicion and hostility by Indian nobles; they were upstarts and direct
rivals. 41 
’
In states not adopting the regimental system, throughout the second half
of the eighteenth century, new families continued to rise from obscurity
through service and advancement in the older cavalry-based watan system.
For example, we have families such as the Rastes and Patwardhans in
southern Maharashtra, the Rajput states on the western rim of Malwa and
the Muslim state of Bhopal in eastern Madhya Pradesh. ’6
44 Stewart Gordon, The Marathas, 1600-1818, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 117-18.
45 C.B. Baillie Fraser, Military Memoirs of Lt. Col. Skinner, London, 1851, pp. 188-90.
46 The enormous overland horse trade, which every observer noted in the seventeenth
century, simply continued in the eighteenth, in the form of large annual horse fairs. See





By the opening of the nineteenth century, as Barua has pointed out, there
had been considerable learning by both the European colonial armies
and their opposing Indian rulers. English commanders learned that the
most effective way to weaken the opposition was a negotiated switch of
loyalties.4’ English commanders knew that because of improvements in
their artillery, forts were no longer the sites of decisive battles. Calcutta,
Madras and Bombay had learned that the real stakes of war were taxation
rights, not trading rights. They further learned that the indigenous banking
system was capable of providing enough credit, pledged against future tax
revenues, for a large campaign, and was capable of delivering cash to the
field. Commanders well understood the rhythm of the campaigning season
and the necessity of monsoon shelter. 
,
On the Indian side, there had also been considerable learning. Like
European kings, Indian rulers knew only too well the vagaries of armies
loyal to kinsmen or based on ’feudal’ levies. In the late eighteenth century,
Indian rulers learned that loyalty could be bought with regular cash salaries,
training, and uniforms. They understood the value of a unit which could
retreat without rout. Many built armouries and regular garrisons for the
troops during monsoon. Like their European opponents. Indian rulers
developed relations with indigenous bankers capable of advancing the cash
necessary to pay the troops.
Nevertheless, the unsolvable problem for Indian rulers went beyond
strategy or military organisation. Real commitment to the new system
(Shinde, Tipu, Ranjit Singh) meant jettisoning the older nobility and the
watan structure on which it was based. This was true for two reasons. To pay
the new European-style forces, the ruler needed the revenue alienated to
nobles in watan. Also, the new battles gave no scope for the older
nobility to prove their prowess and enhance their watans. The Peshwa’s
newswriter at Shinde’s court (in the early 1780s) recognised the problem
when he wrote, as follows:
As for his army expenditure, the Maratha forces from the Deccan have
been suffering appalling miseries which I am unable to describe in
words. They are not able to pay off their debts even by selling their
horses. A trooper hardly gets Rs 10 a month; how can he live on this?
Mahadji [Shinde] has spent tremendously on his new regiments of
infantry, but his eminent Maratha assistants, who laid down their lives
.capturing Gohad and Gwalior, have suffered terrible destitution. 48
47 Barua, ’Developments’, pp. 613-14.
48 Quoted in G.S. Sardesai, Main Curnents of Maratha History, Bombay, revised edition,
1949, p. 148.
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Throughout the 1780s, Shinde dropped Maratha cavalry which had been
recruited by the old watan system and hired Muslims, Rajputs and Gosains
on cash salaries. 49
The strongest commitment to the new style of army appears to have
come from rulers with the least overall commitment to an older watan-
based nobility. Illegitimate heirs such as Shinde, usurpers such as Tipu,
Ranjit Singh as the leader of a ’peasant&dquo; based movement, pretenders such
as Ragnath Rao, and women rulers such as Begam Samru readily adopted
the new forces, sometimes initially against their own hostile nobility and
local militarised groups. 
-
It is also noteworthy that the new forces were adopted only by larger
territorial rulers. Rulers throughout India seemed well aware that only
large states, with prospects of regular income, could afford to pay European
officers and the infantry. Perhaps smaller states were also aware that the
new system was only effective in large scale, and that a long-term commit-
ment to a substantial regular flow of cash required a tax-collecting and
credit structure beyond their means.
Throughout the eighteenth century, there is little evidence that rulers
developed new symbolic structures to tie infantry in bonds of legitimacy
and loyalty, as the older horse-based honours of robes, daggers, trappings
and jewels had tied the cavalry to the king. The important exception was
Tipu Sultan, who developed regimental colours, medals and a whole range
of honours associated with European armies of the time. 5° Crucially, no
Indian ruler was able to convert his watan-based cavalry leaders into
efficient, trained, well rewarded leaders of infantry units. All Indian rulers
were forced to rely on Europeans, whose loyalty was never tied to the ruler
with the complex of symbols, landholding, and often kinship which tied
the king to the older nobility.
In the eigliteenth century, a king experienced problems whichever military
system he chose. He either cobbled nobles and local military families into
an effective cavalry force by the watan system or tried to find enough taxes
and creditors to pay the wages of the new artillery/infantry units. Neither
path was ’right’ or ’wrong’. Each king, pretender, or usurper made his best
judgement about his situation.
Finally, I wish to emphasise that adoption of the European regimental
system was not the deciding factor in a state’s survival. Eighteenth and
early nineteenth century India was not some sort of Darwinian situation,
49 The British Resident thought that Shinde was but little inconvenienced by the desertion of
the unpaid Maratha troops and their leaders, as others were readily available. See India
Office Library, Bengal Political and Secret Proceedings, June-September 1786, pp. 476-80.
50 Indian rulers, by and large, retained the same horse-based honours right through the
British conquest of India. See Kate Brittlebank, ’Curiosities, conspicuous piety and the maker
of time: Some aspects of kingship in eighteenth-century South India’, South Asia, Vol. 16 (2),
1993, pp. 45-46.
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with those states adopting the new system somehow forcing out ’conser-
vatives’ who retained the older cavalry system. If we track the survival of
states as princely states into the nineteenth century, some of the militarily
adaptive states like Shinde survived, some like Tipu did not. Likewise,
hundreds of the smaller states based on cavalry and familial entrepreneur-
ship survived as princely states in the nineteenth century. If anything,
many more of the states based on watan and cavalry survived because they
threatened British colonial power far less than larger states with infantry
forces, such as Ranjit Singh’s Punjab or Tipu’s Mysore.
